This essay critically engages proposals by Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar meant to combat 'the resource curse.' Pogge and Wenar call for boycotts against stealing oppressors, sharing the expectation that the boycotts will significantly contribute to economic and political reform in the target countries. In contrast, I argue that liberal democracies should indeed stop trading with dictators and civil warriors, but for inward rather than outward looking reasons. We, the citizens of liberal democracies through our elected governments, ought to boycott severely oppressive regimes for the sake of our own moral integrity*simply in order to stop being complicit in what is effectively massive scale armed robbery. This inward looking thesis is distinctive in three ways. First, it contrasts with the dominant assumption that global reform must be grounded in the achievement of better political and economic outcomes for others. Second, the inward look manages to avoid the profound empirical uncertainty associated with any attempt to predict the direct effects of global rule changes on domestic institutions. Third, by isolating each democracy's responsibility for each case of illicit trade, the inward looking strategy deals more adequately than the outward view with collective action problems, and therefore has a greater chance of grounding actual reforms, with whatever prospects for better outcomes they may entail.
Few concepts have such a dramatic presence in global affairs as the 'resource curse. ' In many countries around the world, the abundance of precious natural resources, far from being a blessing, produces political and economic disasters. Goods like oil and diamonds that are supposed to belong to the people and ensure their prosperity are taken from them by brute force, and turn into an origin of poverty, conflict, and oppression. Dictators and civil warriors get richer, more powerful and often more brutal by selling these goods to foreign governments and corporations without any form of consent from the people, formally recognized as the legitimate owners. These oppressors then use their augmented riches, power and brutality to further secure their control over a population kept in abject conditions. This essay critically engages two important accounts, offered by Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar, meant to combat this man-made curse. Pogge and Wenar call for boycotts against stealing oppressors, sharing (despite important philosophical differences) the expectation that the boycotts will significantly contribute to economic and political reform in the target countries.
My purpose here is to endorse the boycott proposal, but on the basis of a different rationale. Though admirable, I argue that the hope for better outcomes for the curse's victims cannot be the foundation of democratic boycotts. 1 That is why, under the alternative advanced here, our immediate focus ought to be not 'them'*the world's deprived and oppressed*but ourselves. We, the citizens of liberal democracies through our elected governments and corporations, ought to boycott severely oppressive regimes for the sake of our own moral integrity. Democratic trade with severely oppressive regimes makes us materially complicit in massive-scale theft. As an inherent wrong, I will argue this complicity is a necessary and sufficient justification for boycotts, independently of their consequences for the curse's victims.
A few preliminary remarks help explain the importance of this argument and frame what follows, beginning with terminology. I will be contrasting throughout an 'inward looking' focus on our own moral integrity and an 'outward looking' perspective on others' outcomes. I will not be employing the more traditional contrast between 'deontological' (standards of inherent right) and 'consequentialist' approaches, for two main reasons. First, Pogge's institutional conception of human rights rests on the (contested) claim that affluent democracies violate deontological constraints by failing to ensure certain institutional outcomes for the world's poor. This means that the label 'deontological' does not by itself capture the difference between our views. 2 Rather, this difference rests in my attempt to dissociate our constraints from others' outcomes: I stress that certain actions are morally problematic in themselves, constituting a violation of negative duties not to harm, independently of broader institutions or others' circumstances. 3 Second, the overwhelming majority of global justice theorists, including Pogge and Wenar, assume that improvement of others' outcomes is the fundamental starting point for practically any global reform. This is the sense in which the entire global justice literature is 'outward looking.' In contrast, I claim that we ought to initiate global reform in order to correct our own inherent wrongs. My thesis is thus distinct precisely because it is inward looking. 4 Less clarification, I assume, will be needed as to why theft is an inherent wrong. One does not have to adopt Kant's metaphysics in order to endorse his insistence that the common sense of even a 'child of eight years old' shows that stealing the deposit of a deceased man is wrong even when the deceased's heirs are 'rich, uncharitable, thoroughly extravagant and luxurious.' 5 Kant's remainder, that the violation of duty in such cases makes a man 'worthless although he has filled his purse,' 6 reflects the standard of basic moral decency or integrity to which I will appeal here. 7 If this integrity is compromised even when the victim is 'extravagant S. Nili and luxurious,' it is clearly even more endangered when one is stealing from some of the world's poorest people. Though Pogge and Wenar do not object to this inward looking integrity, they see it merely as a supporting reason for boycott, with others' outcomes being the grounding reason. In what follows I try to show that the opposite ought to be the case: our own decency must be the grounds, relegating to a supporting role the hope for better outcomes. This shift matters normatively, empirically, and strategically. Normatively, the grounding reason for stopping to steal can never be improvement in the victim's condition, since this would make the duty to avoid theft entirely contingent on the victim's prospects. Empirically, by positing our own decency as the grounding reason for boycotts, the inward look avoids the uncertainty associated with any attempt to predict the direct outcomes of global rule changes, uncertainty which crucially limits the force of Wenar's and Pogge's outward look. 8 Strategically, the inward look isolates each democracy's responsibility for each case of illicit trade, and thus dissolves collective action problems that haunt the outward view. Much before the empirical and strategic arguments, however, the conceptual framework needs to be fleshed out. This is the task of the first, main part of the essay.
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
The purpose of this section is to show that the immediate normative problem we face regarding the resource curse is our relation to other nations' lack of control over their property, rather than the achievement of better distribution of benefits for them. In order to support this argument I begin with a conceptual analysis of ownership, meant to corroborate the idea that owners' control over their property matters independently of benefits. I then move to argue that when it comes to national ownership, genuine control requires democracy (in contrast to Wenar's view), even independently of benefits (in contrast to Pogge). This means, first, that democracy should be seen as a standard of legitimacy and second, that when it comes to peoples ruled by manifestly non-democratic regimes, our relation to their lack of control is in itself a moral problem. 9 By this I do not mean to say that the distribution of benefits has no meaning, or that all manifestly non-democratic governments represent equally urgent problems. Regimes that clearly rob their population of the benefits of national resources (call these 'depriving dictatorships') are certainly different from 'distributive dictatorships' that do channel most of the revenue from national goods to the people. Yet in order to see the inward-looking reasons for this difference we need a conceptual analysis of ownership.
Ownership between control and benefits
Ownership is comprised of two related yet distinct components: control and benefits. Owners are the only ones who have the authority to decide how to use their property, including what to do with any benefits that may accrue from this property. If Jane is Conceptualizing the curse the sole owner of a house, then she is the sole individual who can legitimately sell it to anyone, and*taxation notwithstanding*is also the sole individual entitled to the proceeds from the sale, which she can use as she pleases.
In regular circumstances the distinction between control and benefits is rarely made, yet there can be property rights violations that have to do solely with control, independently of benefits. Assuming Jane is a rational adult, her ownership rights will be infringed if she would wake up one morning and discover that her parents, without her consent, have sold her house simply because they thought it was time for her to move elsewhere. This is clearly a problem even if Jane receives the house's full value as payment. Or, consider a case where Jane owns the house together with her spouse, who decides alone to mortgage the asset in order to fund bets. In both cases, Jane's material interests might have been promoted by the use of her property (if the bets happen to succeed), but this does not change the fact that she has been involuntarily deprived of control over it. Therefore her rights as an owner have not been respected. 10 The objection might arise that the most important function of control is to ensure benefits, and it therefore does not really matter who exercises control as long as benefits are secured. But such an objection has distinctly paternalistic overtones, which conflict with the liberal commitment to autonomy. Equal respect for agents' property rights is part of the overarching idea of respecting agents' freedom of choice. Agents ought to be respected as equally autonomous as a matter of inherent right that is independent of good outcomes or benefits. It matters, in other words, that agents are treated equally, independently of what they may or may not get.
Specifically with regards to ownership, this distinction means that we ought to examine whether a property regime respects agents as equally entitled to choose how to dispense of their possessions, independently of the benefits this regime may generate for them. Promoting interests is not the same as respecting rights. It follows that control, not only benefits, must be retained if ownership is to be properly exercised. With this insistence in mind, we can turn to the concept of national ownership.
The importance of national ownership
National ownership is an immediate corollary of the fact that the world is divided into separate territories. 'Territory,' as Wenar points succinctly, 'is property, ' 11 and property always relies on coercive authority. Therefore, as long as even ardent cosmopolitans avoid a defense of a global sovereign, the sovereign power of separate states is needed to maintain stability, and protect separate territories*and the property they encompass*against both internal and external threats. National property, then, is unlikely to disappear anytime soon.
But who owns this property? In the era of absolute monarchy, national property belonged to the ruler. When the king proclaimed 'I am the state,' this also meant that everything that the state owned was, by definition, his. Contemporary sensitivities S. Nili reject this individualization. The people are now treated as sovereign: the state is 'them.' A state's property is accordingly understood as belonging to its people rather than those wielding effective political power. Canada's oil belongs to the Canadian people, not to the Canadian Prime Minister. French Coal belongs to the French People, not to the French President. The same applies to all of the world's nations. 12 I argue that the idea of national ownership requires establishing minimalprocedural democracy*free and fair elections with a rule of law*as a standard of legitimacy relating to control over national resources, independently of benefits. 13 This standard importantly differs from both Wenar and Pogge. 14 Since these differences ground the two distinct justifications for boycotts, they are worth tracking in detail.
National ownership and democratic control
We can begin with Wenar's attempt to establish a more minimal standard than democracy for the exercise of national ownership. This standard is comprised of three conditions borrowed directly from standard commercial law: the people, just like an individual, must be able to (1) find out about the sale of their resources; (2) stop the sales without suffering severe costs; and (3) do so without being subject to extreme manipulation by the seller. 15 These criteria say nothing about benefits, and rightly so. Yet while the three criteria are certainly necessary for any legitimate transfer of property, they are not sufficient. Recall once more Jane's disrespectful spouse who mortgages the house they both own without her consent. Imagine that the spouse responds to Jane's likely anger by saying that she could have found out about the sale had she wanted, could have stopped it without suffering severe costs, and without being extremely manipulated. It seems fully justifiable for Jane to answer that all of this might be true yet still unconvincing: whether or not she might have agreed is simply not the point. As she did not actually agree to the sale, her spouse had no right to decide alone what to do with their property. 16 Actual consent, as opposed to potential one, is necessary for legitimate transfer of ownership. And when it comes to national ownership, actual consent, even if by delegates, does require democracy. 17 Pogge too contends that actual consent is necessary, yet problematically brings in benefits. Responding to Wenar's three criteria, he writes:
Would you agree that another person's sale of your car or land, and pocketing of the proceeds, is valid so long as merely you (1) were able to find out about the sale, (2) were able to stop the sale without incurring severe costs, and (3) were not subject to extreme manipulation by the seller? I would be surprised. Of course, the one additional element whose presence, in conjunction with the others, would legitimate the sale of your car or land is that you (4) actually authorized the sale.
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The problem here is that while the 'pocketing of the proceeds' may be particularly disturbing, this does not mean the lack of control is not already wrong in itself. The same is true for Wenar's hypothetical US example:
Conceptualizing the curse
In the years leading up to the Reagan administration, companies such as Shell discovered large oil deposits off the coasts of Louisiana and Florida. One can imagine the response had President Reagan secretly sold this oil to Shell, then put the profits from these sales into his private bank account and ordered the FBI to detect and squash any dissent. America's natural resources must not be disposed of in ways that wholly bypass the assent of the American people. 19 Again, should we be worried only about the private embezzlement of national revenue (the outcome) or is the illegitimate process in itself a moral concern? Wenar and Pogge wish to change processes in order to change the distribution of benefits. While intuitive, this does not give legitimate procedure its due weight, independently of outcomes.
In failing to give to procedures such independent importance, Pogge and Wenar do not distinguish as strongly as is necessary between procedural legitimacy and just outcomes. The result is counter-intuitive in several ways. First, if outcomes are tied to procedural legitimacy, dictators around the world that ensure distributive outcomes favorable to much of their population necessarily acquire normative legitimacy. But we ordinarily think that citizens are not bound to obey a procedurally illegitimate regime, no matter what distributive outcomes it produces. One would have been hard-pressed to explain to well-off Chileans living under Pinochet, for instance, why distributive outcomes that benefit them mean that they must accept the dictator's usurpation of political power as legitimate.
Second, tying together procedural legitimacy and just outcomes risks marginalizing the key notion that procedural legitimacy is a lower threshold and a precondition for (full) substantive justice, at the very least under the Rawlsian framework that both Pogge and Wenar share domestically. 20 From a Rawlsian perspective, there can be legitimate regimes that are not just, but procedurally illegitimate regimes can never be fully just. To illustrate the latter point, many egalitarians would probably be glad to see the United States imitate Scandinavian welfare policy, but few would describe such change as either just or legitimate* morally binding*were it introduced by a military dictatorship. As for the former point, even those who believe that the Republican Party in the United States, for instance, unjustly serves the interests of only 'a small fraction of the richest citizens' 21 are not likely to say that the rest of the American citizenry can legitimately refuse to obey a Republican President or Congress. The distribution of benefits in the United States (and other liberal democracies) might very well be far from just in terms of its outcomes, but it still follows from a legitimate, democratically controlled, morally binding procedure.
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The procedural threshold for political obligation must be lower than the threshold of full substantive, outcomes-related justice. To be sure, it is also a foundational tenet of Rawlsian liberalism, as it is of most contemporary democratic theory, that the democratic procedure, properly understood, constrains the set of legitimate outcomes. Thus, for instance a decision by a majority to deprive the minority of citizenship will be logically incoherent and illegitimate*not only a manifest failure to give public reasons, but also (to use a Kantian language closer to Habermas) a 'contradiction-in-will.' 23 One of the key functions of the rule of law is of course to S. Nili prevent such failures and contradictions. Yet within the substantive constraints imposed by the democratic procedure, any outcome will be legitimate whether or not it is just. This relationship between legitimacy and justice matters here for two related reasons. First, the priority of the properly constrained procedure to substantive outcomes indicates the need to firmly distinguish control over national resources from benefits*process from outcomes. Second, the idea that the democratic process is a lower threshold than, and a precondition for, fully just outcomes, also intuitively connects with the thought that our immediate global problem must be our own relation to illegitimate procedures, independently of the desire to promote better outcomes for others. This means that we need to respect the rights of other peoples to control their resources, independently of the distribution of benefits from these resources. We need to stop violating other peoples' rights as owners, independently of what material benefits they may or may not derive from this change.
Democracies as bad faith purchasers
In trading with severely oppressive regimes, democracies violate the right of the peoples living under these regimes to control their property. Affluent democracies play a key role in entrenching the customary international law which violates in practice the basic norm of national ownership it recognizes in principle. In the international state system, as Pogge accuses, any person or group exercising effective power in a national territory * regardless of how violently they came to power and how badly they exercise it * is recognized as entitled to act on behalf of its people: to sell their resources, to borrow and sign treaties in their name, and to import the means of internal repression. 24 Two points are central here. First, following what was said so far, forcibly taking control over national resources is in itself a violation of national ownership. Usurpers may distribute wealth from the sale of the resources to the population, but this does not mean they respect national property rights. Second, there is the issue of our exact relation to this lack of control. Here enters the idea that democratic governments and corporations act as bad faith purchasers.
A bad faith purchaser is one who has reasonable ground to suspect that the possessor of a good does not have valid title, yet proceeds to purchase the good nonetheless. Wenar's example captures the point well:
An executive who buys a Rolex from the sales counter at Saks Fifth Avenue is a good faith purchaser. He gains good title to the watch, even if somehow it turns out that Saks received the watch from the Rolex Corporation through deception, duress, or undue influence. But an executive who buys a Rolex on the street from an unshaven man carrying several watches inside his coat cannot be a good faith purchaser. This executive should suspect that the unshaven man may not have good title to the watch. This executive is a bad faith ('mala fide') purchaser, and the law will not favor him. If the true owner of the Rolex appears, a court will order the executive to hand over the watch (or its market value) to that owner. 25 
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The validity of title is dependent on knowledge: does the purchaser's conduct satisfy the requirements of ordinary prudence with regards to the good's history? Should reasonable judgment have led the purchaser to suspect that the good was somehow being offered illicitly? In order to mitigate uncertainty, formal regulations are often put in place. In the mortgage example above, Jane's betting spouse violates Jane's rights as an owner by not seeking her consent for the use of the apartment that she also owns. But the bank that signs off the mortgage deal is also culpable, if it does this in full knowledge that Jane was not even aware of the sale, and therefore did not give her consent. Indeed, the mortgage contract is unlikely to be valid unless Jane too voluntarily signs it. If the buyer cannot reasonably believe that the owner of the good gave proper consent to the sale, then he cannot gain valid title. This is a basic principle of legitimate sale and ownership.
Yet even though this principle is vigorously enforced domestically, globally this is not the case. Specifically, our elected governments purchase, and allow our corporations to purchase, some of the world's most valuable goods from autocracies that do not allow their populations to exert anything like democratic control over national property. We therefore trade on a massive scale with the possessors, rather than owners, of some of the world's most precious resources. Pogge gives the following example:
A group that overpowers the guards and takes control of a warehouse may be able to give some of the merchandise to others, accepting money in exchange. But the fence who pays them becomes merely the possessor, not the owner, of the loot. Contrast this with a group that overpowers an elected government and takes control of a country. Such a group, too, can give away some of the country's natural resources, accepting money in exchange. In this case, however, the purchaser acquires not merely possession, but all the rights and liberties of ownership, which are supposed to be * and actually are * protected and enforced by all other states' courts and police forces. 26 Now, our governments and corporations cannot plausibly argue that they are bona fide purchasers who lack knowledge of property violations in other countries. Practically any individual with an internet connection, let alone the most powerful conglomerates and states, can easily access extensive and reliable information on political and economic circumstances concerning almost any spot on the planet. Feigning surprise at news that a certain country suffered from a military coup and is ruled by a junta is hardly the basis of bona fide behavior, at the very least in moral if not in strict legal terms. Yet what are we supposed to do if it is indeed agreed that our governments and corporations are bad faith purchasers? 27 It is here that the outward and inward looking perspectives part ways. Both answer that we ought to boycott severely oppressive regimes*stop recognizing dictators as legitimate in selling their peoples' property. Yet the first justifies the boycott through concern for benefits: we need to withdraw dictators' trading privileges in order to improve political and economic conditions for the target countries' populations. The second, distinct justification is inward looking and concerned with control, or more broadly with process rather than outcomes. Here the idea is that we need to S. Nili stop our material complicity in crime for the sake of our own moral integrity, independently of any prospects for improved outcomes for others.
This distinction between inward and outward looking justification for the same proposal is far from sophistry. Whether any given policy is adopted must depend, ideally at least, on whether its justification is convincing. I contend that the inward looking perspective provides a compelling justification for boycotts, while the outward look does not. A brief survey of Wenar and Pogge's outward focus sets the stage for this argument.
Pogge and Wenar: the outward hope for benefits
The main goal of Pogge and Wenar's boycott proposals is to combat the vicious cycle of the resource curse for sake of the world's poor and oppressed. Pogge is especially clear on this: 'I oppose the resource privilege because it promotes violence, oppression, and poverty, thereby contributing substantially to massive human rights deficits in poor countries with large natural-resource endowments.' 28 Wenar takes a similar line, both in his reading of Pogge and in his own position. While agreeing that 'the resource privilege, as Pogge says, is both suspect in principle and pernicious in its consequences,' 29 Wenar takes the consequences rather than the principle (that theft is inherently wrong) to be the grounding motivation, emphasizing that 'those who feel the awful toll of poverty, and understand the malleability of institutions [as opposed to seeing them as an incontrollable ''curse''], will look for ways to make global institutions better for the poor...' 30 For Wenar the most dominant feature of the resource curse is the fact that 'many countries rich with natural resources are full of very poor people,' 31 and the key goal of the 'realistic reform of international trade in resources' he proposes is to change their condition, specifically 'to change global institutions so as to reduce repression and severe poverty.' 32 Pogge summarizes their shared motivation in the following, distinctly outward-looking manner:
First, we both understand that what is commonly called the ''resource curse'' is not some unaccountable destiny, like poor soil or proximity to a fault line * but a human-made disaster caused by the resource privilege: the worldwide legal recognition of those who have power in a country as entitled to confer legally valid ownership rights in this country's natural resources to foreign buyers. Second, we both seek to use this understanding toward practical, political ends. We seek ways of reforming the resource privilege so as to curb its fuelling violent political conflicts, oppressive national regimes, and rampant corruption in the less developed countries. 33 I share the insistence that the man-made resource 'curse' is a result of human institutions that can and ought to be reformed. I also agree that we can hope that boycotts of severely oppressive regimes will curb its malicious effects. Yet this hope cannot be the grounding justification for withdrawal of dictators' trading privileges. Such withdrawal must be based on our role in the process of property rights violations, not on their hoped benefits. This is true not only because of the Conceptualizing the curse aforementioned conceptual confusions, produced once legitimacy is associated with distributive outcomes, but also due to empirical reasons.
THE EMPIRICAL DEADLOCK
The outward-looking justification for boycotts encounters an empirical stalemate, given the basic inability to show that boycotts will produce a better distribution of benefits that will significantly ameliorate the resource curse, and specifically extreme poverty. 34 Responding to Pogge's belief that the withdrawal of dictators' trading privileges will significantly contribute to poverty reduction in the target countries, Joshua Cohen, for example, insists that there is 'no reason to accept the claim' that:
. . . changes in global rules would suffice to lift most of the terrible poverty that so many people suffer from. In particular, I see no case for the claim that such changes will suffice holding domestic institutions fixed, and no reason to think that they will suffice by changing incentives and opportunities in ways that induce povertyalleviating changes in domestic institutions. 35 The same challenge applies to Wenar's concrete proposal for combating the resource curse. Wenar suggests designating (on the basis of the worst category of the Freedom House index) 36 a list of regimes that violate any of the three minimal conditions for valid consent for sale, mentioned earlier, and thus clearly violate their peoples' property rights. But it is far from clear that this proposal will help in addressing the resource curse in general and poverty in particular. Cohen emphasizes two main issues:
First, there is the problem of useless sanction (useless in terms of alleviating extreme poverty). A number of the countries that might be subject to sanction because of their unaccountable regimes are places (Saudi Arabia, Syria, Belarus, Tunisia, and Cuba) with very little extreme poverty. Others are places*like China and Vietnam*with very high growth rates, in which it is hard to see how the proposal would help on the poverty issue, and*while acknowledging the difficulties of estimating general equilibrium effects*might well make things worse. Second, Much extreme poverty is in countries*India, Nigeria, and Bangladesh*that are well within the accountability conditions required for valid contracts, and would thus face no troubles. 37 But the claim here is not that we should endorse Cohen's pessimism as such. Rather, my purpose is to point to a fundamental epistemic problem: we can hardly make any concrete predictions regarding the boycotts' direct impact, one way or the other. The basic difficulty derives from the simple fact that we cannot have comparative evidence from any other world. This means that we have no way to know whether wide-scale boycotts will indeed induce political and economic change in the target countries*we cannot compare them to past experience as boycotts of such scale are unprecedented. It does seem safe to say that dramatic shifts are extremely likely if dozens of states boycott dozens of others. But we cannot know what direction these shifts might take. A new Cold War might arise. Massive scale democratization might S. Nili also occur as many severely oppressive regimes might crumble. Differentiated outcomes are certainly possible as well. We simply cannot tell. Therefore we cannot base boycotts on any firm expectation for direct positive outcomes. We may certainly hope for such outcomes, but that is not enough. Hope can only be a supporting rather than grounding reason for boycotts. 38 From this key difficulty several other problems follow. One is that the unknown impact of the proposed boycotts might very well dwarf in significance any other reform of global rules, Pogge, for instance, advocates. This is important since much of the empirical dispute between Pogge and critics like Cohen revolves around the expected contribution of such other reforms, for instance the elimination of affluent nations' protectionist trade barriers. 39 Even if this elimination by itself will indeed contribute significantly to reducing extreme poverty, general equilibrium effects resulting from boycotts might very well cancel this achievement*again, given the staggering variety of factors influencing the global economy, we just cannot know.
Admittedly, there might be specific cases where the population truly cannot be faring any worse in basic material terms, and so there seems to be nothing to lose in terms of outcomes in boycotting them. But such a narrowing of the focus already distances us from any aspiration for a robust reduction of global poverty (and specifically from the goal of halving extreme poverty, which Pogge defines as the benchmark for major improvement). 40 In fact, the boycott proposal also raises questions about the other side of Pogge's insistence that 'minor modifications in the global order that would entail at most slight reductions in the incomes of the affluent' 41 would suffice to achieve a significant reduction in extreme poverty. Putting aside the question of whether massive scale boycotts can really be defined as 'minor modifications,' it remains far from clear that they will also entail only slight reductions in the income of the affluent. 42 In this sense as well, there seems to be little escape from positing the need for boycotts as a matter of inherent rightness that may trump material interests if need be.
A final empirical problem with the outward looking justification for boycotts is that it cannot guide us in making judgments regarding differentiated outcomes, if such outcomes will indeed occur, either spatially or temporally. Spatially, if adopting the boycott proposal means that the people of target country A fare better materially, while conditions for peoples of countries B, C, and D deteriorate, should we go ahead with the idea or not? Temporally, what should we decide if the people of a given country suffer economically for a certain time period, and only then, as the entrenched regime can no longer bear the external pressure, enjoy improvement? Is such a scenario of 'one step back and two steps forward' one that we should endorse (if its probability could at all be assessed, which, as emphasized above, is already in doubt)? 43 These are enormously complex questions. Each question by itself, let alone all of them together, may halt a reform of dictators' trading privileges in its tracks. The only way to avoid this deadlock is to point to the inherent wrong of our complicity in theft as the grounding justification for a boycott.
Admittedly, the objection is likely that given the horribly tangible plight of the world's deprived, focusing on our relation to their lack of control, rather than trying Conceptualizing the curse to achieve better outcomes for them, represents untenable moral luxury. 44 Such rigorism might be attacked as exhibiting excessive attention to our moral stature at the expense of real world consequences. 45 However, though intuitive, I reject this criticism on three levels. First, most generally, aside from concrete cases in which concern for our moral worth risks our own or others' very survival, there is no reason to marginalize this concern, neither as individuals nor as collective agents. Second, the inward-looking perspective does not deny that cases in which peoples are completely deprived from both control and benefits are more urgent than cases where they do enjoy significant benefits. Congo's problems are certainly more pressing then Saudi Arabia's. But at least one reason for this difference is inwardlooking. With regards to Saudi Arabia we are complicit in the general violation of property rights. With regards to Congo, however, we are actively complicit in the much more specific crime of massive scale theft, or even, more precisely, massive scale armed robbery. And our duty to stop this complicity is therefore much more immediate as well. Wenar is surely right when emphasizing that 'The priority in reforming global commerce is not to replace ''free trade'' with ''fair trade,'' but rather ''to create trade where now there is theft.''' 46 Yet this distinction corroborates the inward looking focus even more than the outward looking view on better outcomes. One has a duty to end one's material involvement in theft independently of outcomes: one's duty not to take part in a crime does not, after all, depend on the victim's identity, on the severity of the victim's condition following the crime, or on whether the crime will go on even without one's participation. We ought to stop our active complicity in crime simply for the sake of duty. This duty holds independently of what others do and, threat to life and limb aside, independently of outcomes. We ought to do stop doing what is manifestly wrong simply because stopping is right*full stop.
Third and last, insisting that each agent must act in accordance with what is right independently of how others behave, insisting, that is, on inherent right and wrong as a grounding reason, still leaves room for the hope for better outcomes, as a supporting reason. The final section explores the implications of this shift.
THE INWARD LOOK * A DIFFERENT STRATEGY FOR CHANGE
The inward look's immediate target is not the resource curse, but rather each democracy's role in the resource curse. Each specific democracy must stop its complicity in robbery independently of whether the robbery will go on without it. Yet this inward look also dissolves a major obstacle facing attempts to address the curse itself: the logic of collective action. The outward look generates a distinct 'buck-passing' problem: each affluent democracy can easily say it is avoiding a boycott of severely oppressive regimes since it knows that by itself it cannot achieve major outcomes. Thus each state can patiently invite others to 'prove their seriousness' before it commits to the task, with the result being, unsurprisingly, no commitment by anyone. The inward look, in contrast, makes the duty to act S. Nili agent-specific: each democracy ought to act by itself, independently of how others behave. The inward look, in other words, manages to disaggregate the problem, breaking it down into its distinct components, and then accumulates the result*as each democracy addresses its own distinct responsibilities, and has a much greater incentive to act, without holding its morality hostage to others' conduct.
These strategic benefits might seem to be in tension with my strong claim above regarding our inability to know the results of boycotts. But the tension is more apparent than real. First, the claim here is about what will make boycotts themselves more likely, not about what the boycotts will produce once they occur. Second, the outward looking view on outcomes hinges on empirical and to a large degree material factors, while the inward looking factors are, in an important sense, ideational. Third, sidelining the direct empirical and material factors increases the longevity of boycotts, by redefining the meaning of their 'success. ' Under the standard, outward looking perspective on boycotts, 'success' means change in the target country. As time passes without such change, the commitment to sustain the boycott rapidly declines and a picture of failure prevails. Yet under the inward looking alternative this is not the case, surely not at the immediate level. Here successful boycotts are those that end the state's complicity in theft without increasing risk to life and limb, either of its own citizens or of the population living in the target countries. These criteria are much easier to satisfy then ensuring profound political and economic reform, thus solving some of the major longevity challenges facing the outward perspective. Now, the objection might arise that it is too arbitrary to define only physical survival as a 'supreme emergency' that allows democracies to override the duty to disengage. Yet threats to bodily integrity pose a distinct danger to individual autonomy: much more than merely hampering, they annihilate autonomy. That is why a boycott launched out of respect for autonomy will be self-defeating if it will hinder survival on a massive scale, but not if it will hinder economic growth. We can justify continued complicity in theft if it is meant to save lives, but not if it is meant to ensure other outcomes. Stealing in order to save your child's life is understandable (even if still illegal) in a way that stealing in order to promote your child's general educational or economic prospects is not. 47 Moving from the boycotted to the boycotters, it seems hard to suggest that affluent democracies need to continue stealing to save their own citizens' lives. With democracies comprising 28 of the world's 30 richest countries, it is difficult to imagine that a boycott of almost any severely oppressive regime will push affluent democracies to the brink of starvation. 48 But of course, for real politics, even if not conceptually, such a threshold will probably be too strict. Any democracy might avoid even contemplating a boycott if it will fear a tangible worsening of living conditions, far short of subsistence problems. However, progress can still be made. First, it is often the case that boycotting countries are far more powerful than the target nations, and here there should not be any fear of dramatic effects on the former. Second, the inward-looking view points much more immediately to each democracy's duty to seek conditions that will allow it to break away from dependence Conceptualizing the curse on powerful dictatorships, mainly with regards to tainted oil. Alternative energy research is a crucial endeavor in this respect, yet democracies do not even need moral preaching as a reason to develop alternative energy sources*there are already powerful pragmatic reasons to do so, from the simple fact that oil is finite to the realpolitik benefits that will be accrued by any democracy that will reduce (let alone overcome) its oil dependency.
This emphasis on the efforts that each democracy can undertake on its own is not in any way meant to be dismissive of multilateral democratic cooperation. It might very well be that better outcomes for the boycotted in certain countries will not come about without multilateral action. Yet by disaggregating the problem into the behavior of each democracy towards each severely oppressive regime, the inward look in fact lays stronger foundations for such action, if only because it initiates change much more easily, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, at least one reason is that in many democracies, leaders and citizens alike have arguably become disenchanted, for both moral and practical reasons, with policies meant to reform (supposedly) 'distant' others. By framing the boycott proposal as meant to ensure our own change, rather than that of others, the inward looking alternative can therefore rely on a greater degree of political consensus than the standard outward view.
Internationally, the inward view is better positioned to commence action towards reform of dictators' trading privileges since it is much less dependent on the commitment of specific powerful democracies, chiefly the United States. The outward looking view forces other democracies to look to the US to act first, knowing that boycotts are unlikely to induce domestic changes in dictatorships if the superpower which is also the world's largest democratic oil importer is not committed to a boycott too. Yet focusing on the US as the starting point (as Wenar, for example, does) 49 is highly problematic. First, in the current and foreseeable international climate few foreign leaders will be eager to present themselves as following too readily American dictates. Second, even more than other affluent democracies, the American political process is heavily skewed precisely in favor of those vested (and particularly oil) interests who are likely to oppose, vigorously, any new handicaps on their business dealings. 50 So not only will foreign leaders be hesitant to follow an American example, the sectarian interests dominating American policy are unlikely to allow such an example to take place. Third, related, when looking at those specific boycotts that did induce change in the target countries, it has often been the US who followed the example of others, and quite reluctantly so, rather than the other way around. This was surely the case with South Africa, for instance, regarding which the US stopped opposing sanctions only in the 1980s, when the Apartheid regime had otherwise been an outcast already for decades. 51 This might also be the case today, in Congo for example, where the US, despite improved formal regulations, is still reluctant to actually put its weight behind the Kimberly process meant to drive blood diamonds out of the market. 52 Therefore, without in any way underestimating the practical importance of American grassroots movements, 53 or of reform proposals such as Wenar's that are especially catered to
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American audience and sensitivities, 54 it seems like other affluent democracies are stronger candidates for making the first steps. The inward look is better positioned to promote such steps.
But even if this argument is endorsed, including the identity of the democracies initiating change, what does this say about the 'other side'? Who, in fact, should the other side include? Instead of a conclusion, I wish to offer preliminary answers to these two questions.
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION: LOOKING AT THE OTHER SIDE
Both morally and practically, a democratic boycott must begin from the most urgent cases of the 'resource curse.' The focus will have to be on the worst depriving dictators, putting aside, at least as a first stage, distributive dictatorships. Therefore, let us suppose that dozens of liberal democracies, probably also following domestic political reform, do in fact disengage from these 'worst of the worst,' like Congo, Sudan, or Equatorial Guinea. How are the distributive dictatorships, from the Gulf's oil-rich kingdoms to China, supposed to respond?
In many ways this must remain an open question, given all the reasons mentioned above for epistemic humility. Nonetheless, there is room to think that the democratic posture here is important in facing the distributing dictatorships, again for ideational rather than material reasons. On the one hand, the inward look, especially if coupled with extensive budgetary shifts from military expenditure to alternative energy research, 55 will signal to these dictatorships that there is no commitment by democracies to aggressively reform them, thus reducing the likelihood of rallying behind the flag against any 'imperialist meddling' in internal affairs. On the other hand, the inward look also refuses to condone these regimes. The boycott of depriving dictatorships should serve as a clear indication that democracies take their morals seriously. This might, first, push distributing dictatorships to cooperate with regards to the most urgent cases of the resource curse, rather than dismiss democratic foreign policy declarations as mere hypocrisy, as is often the case today. Second, narrowing the gap between democracies' rhetoric and action might also add to distributing dictatorships' own motivation to pursue internal change, given the knowledge that their ties with established democracies are existing on 'borrowed time'*whether until these democracies have addressed the more urgent cases, or until they have used their (unprecedented) collective power, including technological capacities, to free themselves from dependency on autocratic oil.
Epistemic humility notwithstanding, we can maintain, as a supporting hope, the thought that under such ideational pressures, distributing dictatorships might gradually democratize. It will be a major feat if present day Russia, China, or Saudi Arabia will come to take elections seriously. Yet it might just be that such a feat will become more, rather than less likely, if our own goal will not be to 'achieve democracy,' or 'banish the resource curse,' but rather to achieve our own moral Conceptualizing the curse integrity. Changing ourselves, with the explicit aim of our own moral decency, is not only right in itself. It might also be the most effective way to change the world. equality,' but also a thicker substantive concept of 'strong political equality,' which leads to the need 'for the older democracies . . . to perfect and deepen their democracy.' Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 2. I say more below on legitimacy as a lower threshold than justice. 14. And also, perhaps surprisingly, from several other philosophers. As the following discussion shows, this claim is importantly distinct from the idea that liberal justice, say as postulated in Rawls' domestic theory, is a criterion of legitimacy. Procedural outcomes that to not address tangible threats to citizens' very survival might be a substantive exception, yet even this case is far from clear. Normatively, it is far from selfevident that citizens are not morally obligated to obey a democratic system that fails to actively secure a safety net (the pre-'New-Deal' US, for example). It is in fact far easier to define illegitimacy on procedural grounds (thus for instance women in Switzerland were not morally obligated to recognize the authority of governments they could not elect until the 1970s). In addition, the question of threats to subsistence that are left unattended in democracies seems empirically irrelevant, since no democracy has ever allowed famine to take place within its borders. Cf. Amartya Sen, 'Human Rights and Economic Achieve- 
